iZombie Cyborg Dancers: Rechoreographing Smartphone Abusers by Hall, Joshua M.
 
 
Philosophy in the Contemporary World 26:1-2 (Spring/Fall 2020) 
_________________________________ 
 
iZombie Cyborg Dancers: 
Rechoreographing Smartphone 
Abusers 
 
Joshua M. Hall  
 
William Paterson University    
hallj38@wpunj.edu  
________________________________ 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Compulsive smartphone users’ psyches, today, are increasingly 
directed away from their bodies and onto their devices. This phenomenon has now 
entered our global vocabulary as “smartphone zombies,” or what I will call 
“iZombies.” Given the importance of mind to virtually all conceptions of human 
identity, these compulsive users could thus be productively understood as a kind of 
human-machine hybrid entity, the cyborg. Assuming for the sake of argument that 
this hybridization is at worst axiologically neutral, I will construct a kind of 
phenomenological psychological profile of the type of cyborg which engages in these 
patterns of behavior. I follow Judith Butler in seeing this identity as the result of 
performance practices, which as such can be modified or replaced using other 
performances. Pursing one such alternative, I compose a dancing critique that 
“reverse engineers” the choreographies implied by these cyborgs’ survival practices. 
The upshot of this critique is that their movement patterns do indeed align closely to 
those of horror cinema’s zombies. I therefore conclude by suggesting a few possible 
choreographic imperatives to facilitate more enabling ways of being for iZombie 
cyborgs today. 
 
 
 
Compulsive Smartphone Users’ Minds as Extended 
 
THE POINT OF THIS FIRST section for my overall argument is that it is 
strategically counterproductive to treat smartphones as entirely external and 
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independent of (at least) those who use them compulsively, because the nature and 
quality of those users’ cognition, and thus their very minds, have been changed as a 
result of incorporating smartphone technology.  Thus, any attempted solution to (what 
an increasing number of critics are calling) the “smartphone zombie apocalypse” 
which focuses on removing the phone entirely, or on making the phone less central 
to the user’s life, is likely to founder on pragmatic grounds.  For any readers 
unfamiliar with the extended mind thesis, it constitutes one of the four pillars of 4E 
cognitive science, where “4E” is short for a view of cognition as “embodied, 
embedded, extended, and enacted.”   
The flashpoint for the extended 1/4 of this approach is a 1998 essay by Andy 
Clark and David Chalmers entitled “The Extended Mind.”  In it, to justify their 
position, Clark and Chalmers propose several thought experiments.  In the first of 
these, a laboratory subject rotates an image displayed on a computer screen in one of 
the following three ways: (a) in their head (so to speak), (b) using a rotate button on 
the computer, or (c) telekinetically (through a futuristic neural implant).  Such 
combinations of human beings and tools constitute, the authors continue, “a coupled 
system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right” (8, emphasis original).  
To illustrate this point, they then offer the example of the board game Scrabble, in 
which the physical manipulation of the block letters is part of a player’s cognitive act 
of forming words (9-10).   In defending their extended mind thesis against common 
objections thereto, Clark and Chalmers first distinguish between mind and 
consciousness, noting the now-consensus that there is in fact such a thing as 
nonconscious cognition.  Second, they address the objection that such couplings of 
organism and environment are too easily decoupled for their combination to count as 
extended cognition.   
Contra the latter objection, they observe that other easily decoupled systems are 
nevertheless freely admitted as cognition, and then go so far as to anticipate—and 
remember that this essay dates from more than twenty years ago!—the existence of 
smartphones.  “What if people always carried,” they ask, “a pocket calculator, or had 
them implanted?” (11).  This then-hypothetical is now actual, of course, since every 
smartphone is both literally a calculator (i.e. a complex computational machine) and 
also contains a colloquial “calculator” (i.e. a software application, or “app,” that 
performs basic arithmetical operations).  In another similarly prophetic note (relative 
to today’s smartphone world), the authors then present language as an example of an 
external tool that has evolved into intimacy with cognition, in the sense that we 
augment our thinking using words qua visible (written) and tactile (Braille) markings 
and audible objects (spoken words) (11). 
Thirdly on this smartphone-prophetic note, the authors offer the following vision: 
 
Within the lifetime of an organism, too, individual learning may have moulded 
the brain in ways that rely on cognitive extensions that surrounded us as we 
learned. Language is again a central example here, as are the various physical 
and computational artifacts that are routinely used as cognitive extensions by 
children in schools and by trainees in numerous professions (12).  
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Smartphones, I would add, have become an integral part of the education and 
socialization of children in the post-industrial world. 
But the most smartphone-relevant moment in the essay, perhaps, is Clark and 
Chalmers’ famous concluding thought experiment.  It involves a hypothetical 
Alzheimer’s sufferer named “Otto” who carries a notebook with him everywhere, in 
which he writes down any information necessary for his daily routines.  The authors 
interpret this notebook as, in effect, Otto’s external memory bank, which helps him 
compensate for the internal memory bank in his brain that has been damaged by 
Alzheimer’s (13).  To use the authors’ example, Otto could write down the location 
of a museum in his notebook, then consult that entry whenever he has a desire to go 
to the museum.  They claim that the seamless, second-nature way in which Otto thus 
uses the notebook during his ordinary cognitive activities would entail that his beliefs 
(including about museum locations) extend beyond his brain and skin and into his 
notebook.  To defend this position, Clark and Chalmers propose the following four 
stipulations: 
 
First, the notebook is a constant in Otto’s life – in cases where the information in 
the notebook would be relevant, he will rarely take action without consulting it.  
Second, the information in the notebook is directly available without difficulty.  
Third, upon retrieving information from the notebook he automatically endorses 
it.  Fourth, the information in the notebook has been consciously endorsed at 
some point in the past, and indeed is there as a consequence of this endorsement 
(17). 
 
All four of these stipulations are also easily satisfied by compulsive smartphone 
use.  Compulsive users rarely act without using them, can access their information 
easily, automatically endorse that information, and the current content is a result of 
their cumulative prior endorsements.   
Additionally in regard to the above block quote, Clark and Chalmers invoke on 
that same page the foremost necessary condition for the existence of smartphones, 
namely the Internet.  And they do so in a way that further supports smartphones’ 
candidacy as objects of mental extension.  Considering whether the worldwide web 
amounts to extended cognition, they write that “The Internet is likely to fail on 
multiple counts, unless I am unusually computer-reliant, facile with the technology, 
and trusting,” with the immediate proviso that “information in certain files on my 
computer may qualify” (17).  Compulsive smartphone users meet all three of these 
independently sufficient exception conditions.  They are “unusually” reliant on 
computers (compared to previous generations), “facile” with their smartphones and 
their apps, and—as the election of Trump has shown—trusting.   
Thus, by Clark and Chalmers’ own logic here, smartphones can feature as an 
external component of extended mind.  Furthermore, since the social media 
applications that dominate compulsive smartphone usage combine the Internet with 
social relationships, the authors’ subsequent suggestion that cognition also be 
“socially extended” (for example in a codependent romantic relationship) strengthens 
the case for smartphone extended minds even more.  Similarly, and to conclude my 
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first section, the authors suggest that extended cognition implies a correlatively 
extended “self” (18).  Their emphasis, with this point, is on seeing “agents themselves 
as spread into the world,” and on seeing “ourselves more truly as creatures of the 
world” (18).  To this, I would add that an “extended self” could also mean a kind of 
singular macro-self that has metastasized (as it were) across multiple human bodies, 
transforming formerly independent embodied minds into drones, or zombies. 
 
Smartphone-Extended Minds as Cyborgs 
 
In the prior section, I attempted to show that, if one accepts the reasoning in Clark 
and Chalmers’ articulation of their extended mind thesis, it follows that mind can 
extend specifically into smartphones, at least for compulsive users.  To get clearer on 
what results from this joint mind’s collaborative cognition, I now turn to Donna 
Haraway’s argument that all late twentieth century homo sapiens are cyborgs.  The 
point of this second section for my overall argument is that the extension of minds 
from brains to smartphones entails a fundamental transformation for not only the 
mental dimension of compulsive smartphone users, but also for their bodies.  Thus, 
any attempted solution to the smartphone zombie apocalypse which grants the 
extended mind thesis, but which focuses only on cognition (to the exclusion of 
embodiment), is unlikely to be sufficiently holistic to be effective.   
To make the case for this mind-and-body transformation, I will now offer a new 
interpretation of Donna Haraway’s famous “Cyborg Manifesto.”  I begin by noting 
its much less famous subtitle: “Science, Technology and Socialist-Feminism in the 
Late Twentieth Century,” which alerts the reader that Haraway’s manifesto is 
primarily a feminist, and secondarily a Marxian one.  In short, it seeks militant 
gendered justice by way of dialectical materialism.  Haraway’s first section is called 
“An ironic dream of a common language for women in the integrated circuit” (5).  
She then paraphrases this dream as an “ironic political myth faithful to feminism, 
socialism, and materialism,” with “faithful” immediately qualified as intended in the 
sense in which “blasphemy is faithful” (5).  At the “center” of this blasphemy, 
Haraway concludes, “is the image of the cyborg” (5).  That her conception of cyborgs 
is thus self-consciously mythical and ironic foreshadows how easily her detailed 
conception of it gels with my satirical deployment of the figure of the zombie for 
compulsive smartphone cyborgs.   
The gist of Haraway’s detailed conception begins in the manifesto with her oft-
quoted definition of a cyborg.  “A cyborg is a cybernetic organism,” she writes, “a 
hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of 
fiction” (5).  More specifically, as she elaborates on the next page, the cyborg’s fiction 
is of the scientific variety.  Contemporary science fiction, she observes, “is full of 
cyborgs,” adding that “the boundary between science fiction and social reality is an 
optical illusion” (6).  Given the implication of this claim, that science fiction creatures 
move among us in real life almost invisibly, a further implication is that the science 
fiction figure of the zombie is welcomed into the machine menagerie of everyday life.  
Thus, someone as innocuous as a smartphone user could qualify for cyborg status.  
Haraway’s further unpacking of this cyborg concept also resonates with Clark and 
Chalmers’ “Extended Mind” essay, and even more so with Clark’s later work on 
iZombie Smartphone Dancers  
 5 
 
extended minds.  I refer, more specifically, to Haraway’s use of the concept of 
“couplings,” including between “organism and machine” (6).  In his Being There, 
Clark writes of “fluent coupling between the system and a real-world environment” 
(2).  Dance, too, involves (often literal) coupling.  Moreover, this reference to fluent 
coupling foreshadows the importance of dance as an example throughout Clark’s 
book.   
Just as extended minds seem ultimately positive for Clark, so the cyborg seems 
for Haraway, if not inherently positive, then at least something that feminist activists 
ought to view positively for strategic effectiveness.  This is not to say that Haraway 
is blind to its limitations and flaws, in her discussion of which there is much that 
resonates with zombies.  For example, Haraway claims that “the cyborg is also the 
awful apocalyptic telos of the ‘West’s’ escalating dominations of abstract 
individuation, an ultimate self untied at last from all dependency, a man in space” (8).  
In other words, cyborgs make the most of their physical movements without input or 
cooperation from the physical movements of anything else.  In the case of compulsive 
smartphone cyborgs, they instead drift aimlessly through the physical space on which 
their virtual space supervenes.  The cause of this movement style is perhaps found in 
what Haraway identifies as the cyborgs’ genealogy.  They are, she writes, “the 
illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism” (9).  Just like a 
stereotypical patriarchal male, and the military forces he commands, the compulsive 
smartphone user is oblivious and/or indifferent to its body’s negative impacts on 
others’ bodies. 
 After this critical concession, Haraway returns to her definition of the 
cyborg, which she claims essentially crosses the following three important 
boundaries: human/nonhuman animal, animal/machine, and physical/nonphysical.  
The latter two dichotomies are the most important in the case of smartphone cyborgs, 
so they will be my focus here.  Regarding the animal/machine boundary, Haraway 
first notes that, prior to the Information Age,  
 
basically machines were not self-moving, self-designing, autonomous. They 
could not achieve man's dream, only mock it. They were not man, an author to 
himself, but only a caricature of that masculinist reproductive dream. To think 
they were otherwise was paranoid. Now we are not so sure. Late twentieth-
century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the difference between 
natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and externally designed, 
and many other distinctions that used to apply to organisms and machines. Our 
machines are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert (11). 
 
Put simply, contemporary machines are increasingly similar to humans, and it is 
no longer obvious that there is a sharp line between them and us.  The final sentence 
of this block quote captures perfectly the flashing and beeping smartphone in the 
hands of an otherwise immobile human body. 
As for the third boundary that cyborgs cross, the physical/nonphysical, 
Haraway’s description of it contains three claims resonant with smartphone cyborgs 
in particular.  First, she notes that “Modern machines are quintessentially electronic 
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devices: they are everywhere and they are invisible” (12-13).  Not only are 
smartphones electronic, and everywhere in contemporary U.S. urban environments, 
but they are also invisible insofar as the content on their surfaces are invisible to all 
but the users (or someone situated very closely thereto).  Second, Haraway adds that 
cyborgs “are as hard to see politically as materially.  They are about consciousness, 
or its simulation.  They are floating signifiers moving in pickup trucks across Europe” 
(13).  Smartphone users, similarly, (a) are approaching 100% of the U.S. population, 
at least in most urban, middle-to-upper class spaces—hiding in the plain sight of 
ubiquity; and (b) frequently simulate consciousness, including (c) when driving or 
riding down the highway.  Finally in regard to the physical/nonphysical boundary, 
the following quote is perhaps the most poetically apt for smartphones:  
 
Our best machines are made of sunshine; they are all light and clean because they 
are nothing but signals, electromagnetic waves, a section of a spectrum, and these 
machines are eminently mobile – a matter of immense human pain in Detroit and 
Singapore (13).  
 
The three specific resonances with smartphones here are (a) the “mobile” half of 
“mobile phone,” (b) the pain for Detroit’s automotive transportation industry caused 
by smartphones’ virtual transportation, and (c) the pain for Singapore of its poor 
women of color constructing microchips for smartphones.   
On the latter subject, of  female Asian smartphone workers, and to end my 
reading of Haraway’s manifesto on a dancing note, her concluding summary suggests 
that “it might be the unnatural cyborg women making chips in Asia and spiral dancing 
in Santa Rita Jail whose constructed unities will guide effective oppositional 
strategies” (14).  Santa Rita Jail is a California prison which routinely brings in 
musical performers to play for their minimum-security inmates, who greatly enjoy 
dancing to the music.  Thus, Haraway explicitly identifies and symbolizes her new 
cyborgs as dancers, which bodes well for my dancing interpretation of smartphone 
cyborgs below.  Before moving on to that analysis, though, I will first buttress 
Haraway’s linkage of cyborg identity to dance by retracing Judith Butler’s argument 
for the danced nature of identity per se. 
 
Cyborg Identity as Dance Performance 
 
In my second section, I attempted to show that if one accepts the reasoning in 
Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto,” then the extension of human minds into smartphones 
entails the creation of a new ontological entity, which she terms “cyborgs,” and which 
she associates both implicitly and explicitly with dance.  To buttress this conception 
of cyborg identity, as well as its connection to dance, I now turn to Judith Butler’s 
argument for identity as, at a metaphysical level, a kind of residue of repeated 
performances.  The point of this third section for my overall argument is that the 
cyborg identity of smartphone extended minds is fundamentally a process of dance.  
Thus, any attempted solution to the smartphone zombie apocalypse which grants the 
existence of Haraway’s cyborgs, but which sees those cyborgs as constituted by some 
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sort of fixed core or essence, is likely to be too rigid and complacent, at a theoretical 
or methodological level, to facilitate sustainable evolution and positive change.   
Although Butler’s Gender Trouble focuses on the sex/gender aspects of 
embodiment, her claims can easily be extended, mutatis mutandis, to identity as a 
whole, which is the goal of my interpretation here.  Early on, Butler observes that 
“representation is extended only to what can be acknowledged as a subject” (4).  The 
context of this claim is Butler’s discussion of the central goal of the women’s suffrage 
movement, namely full legal and political representation for women.  Butler’s critique 
of this goal, following Simone de Beauvoir, is that the concept of “woman” is a social 
construct, which neither corresponds to any natural (i.e. precultural) group of entities, 
nor refers (in its conventional usage) to many of the bodies of people who identify as 
female.  Butler’s examples of the latter include lesbians, women of color, and intersex 
people (to which I would add transwomen).  Put in Haraway’s terms, one could say 
that there is a kind of cyborg-phobia in the way that our institutions deploy the word 
“woman,” a fear of those who do not fit preexisting notions about who a “real” or 
“natural” woman is.  Consequently, those cyborgs are insufficiently represented in 
the struggle for gendered justice. 
Instead, Butler continues, “juridical systems of power produce the subjects they 
subsequently come to represent” (4).  If one thinks, with Plato and others, of the body 
politic as a group of dancers, and of the rulers as choreographers, then one can easily 
put Butler’s point in explicitly dancing terms.  To wit, selected bodies are first 
socialized to perform the role of “woman,” with all analyses of women (including 
feminist ones) subsequently directed only toward the bodies already socialized to 
perform the role of woman correctly—where “correctly” means “recognizably” (4).  
In other words, the fact that certain bodies are consistently cast to play a particular 
role in society’s “ballet” (in this case, primarily cis-het middle-to-upper class white 
women cast as “woman”) leads social critiques to rely on homogeneous conceptions 
of that role.  Thus there is established a kind of negative feedback loop, punishing 
deviance from dominant cultural norms for “women,” which norms are implicitly 
upper-middle class, straight, white, cisgender, able-bodied, etc.  In Butler’s words, 
“the feminist subject turns out to be discursively constituted by the very political 
system that is supposed to facilitate its emancipation” (4).  Put more simply, feminism 
(in the era in which Butler was writing) had tended to attempt to liberate only 
“normal” women.   
If this is true, however, one might wonder why there is not more evidence of this 
targeting, socializing, rewarding and punishing.  Anticipating this objection, Butler 
explains that “juridical subjects are invariably produced through certain exclusionary 
practices that do not ‘show’ once the juridical structure of politics has been 
established” (5).  More specifically, although the law presents itself as relating to 
subjects who exist prior to the law, Butler suggests the following: “Perhaps the 
subject, as well as the invocation of a temporal ‘before’, is constituted by the law as 
the fictive foundation of its own claim to legitimacy” (5).  In other words, the law 
includes the fantasy of a pre-legal natural world, populated with natural and pre-
societal humans, even though the law presents that world as an actual reality outside 
the law.   
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This claim recalls Haraway’s claim that today we are all cyborgs, which means 
that we are all figures from science fiction.  In this sci-fi context, one could perhaps 
interpret the fiction of a natural, organic, pre-societal “woman” as a kind of hologram, 
or ghost.  To resist this hologram/ghost army of our juridical institutions, Butler 
declares that the “task” is “to formulate within this constituted frame a critique of the 
categories of identity that contemporary juridical structures engender, naturalize, and 
immobilize” (8).  In other words, Butler suggests that we as feminists go on the 
offensive, attacking the ghosts/holograms by showing them to be fully unnatural.  
More specifically, against these “reifications of gender and identity,” Butler offers “a 
feminist genealogy of the category of women” (9).  By “genealogy” here, Butler 
means the philosophical method pioneered by Nietzsche and elaborated by Foucault. 
The upshot of Butler’s genealogy is that the analogy—sex is to gender as nature 
is to culture—disguises the following crucial fact: “gender must also designate the 
very apparatus of production whereby the sexes themselves are established” (11).  
That is, gender is a performing activity rather than an entity.  Complementarily, Butler 
affirms a quote from Beauvoir, “the body is a situation,” from which Butler infers 
that “‘the body’ is itself a construction, as are the myriad ‘bodies’ that constitute the 
domain of gendered subjects” (13).  In other words, various forces go invisibly into 
the making of a human body, which seems vividly true in the case of the machine-
animal hybrid bodies of smartphone cyborgs.  The primary political implication of 
Butler’s performative analysis of identity in Gender Trouble is what she calls an 
“open coalition,” the method of which is to “affirm identities that are alternately 
instituted and relinquished according to the purposes at hand” (22).  For example, a 
person could adopt a smartphone user identity for a certain period of time, or on 
certain occasions, rather than performing that identity as if it were a permanent state 
of affairs.  In other words, one could go from being a human to a cyborg, and back to 
a human, as called for by a given situation.   
The basis for this resistance, Butler claims, is that “the ‘coherence’ and 
‘continuity’ of ‘the person’ are not logical or analytical features of personhood, but, 
rather, socially instituted and maintained norms of intelligibility” (23).  That is, bodies 
become various different people over time.  In the case of smartphone users, they 
need not always have their smartphone in hand, or ready to hand.  Smartphone identity 
is, as Butler claims of gender identity, “the repeated stylization of the body, a set of 
repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce 
appearance of substance, a natural sort of being” (43-44).  Put simply, if you repeat a 
habit long enough, it becomes second nature; use your smartphone compulsively, and 
you become a smartphone cyborg zombie. 
The second chapter of Gender Trouble focuses on a discussion that does not 
generalize as well as the first chapter to from gender identity to cyborg identity.  
Nevertheless, the end of the second chapter contains a discussion particularly relevant 
for smartphone cyborg identity, regarding the psychoanalytic concept of 
“incorporation.”  As contrasted with “introjection,” incorporation occurs when a 
person compensates for the loss of a loved one by, as it were, taking the deceased 
person into their own body. While Freud and his followers link this incorporation to 
melancholy, Butler endorses psychoanalyst Roy Schafer’s major modification of the 
concept, which he views as “a fantasy and not a process; the interior space into which 
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an object is taken is imagined, and imagined within a language that can conjure and 
reify such spaces” (86).  But if this is true, Butler asks,  
 
Where is this incorporated space?  If it is not literally within the body, perhaps it 
is on the body as its surface signification such that the body must itself be 
understood as an incorporated space (86). 
 
In other words, the space of incorporation is less like the “guts” or bones, and 
more like the surface of the skin.  Or, more precisely, the skin as a kind of virtual 
space on which to project symbols, like a tattoo of the Chinese character for “crisis” 
(危機).  The relevance of this point to smartphone cyborgs is that it supports 
Haraway’s understanding of the issue, which implies that cyborgs can incorporate 
smartphones externally (without having to literally take the phones inside their 
bodies).   
As to healing from incorporation, Butler first rejects the famous proposal from 
psychoanalyst and philosopher Julia Kristeva.  Kristeva claims that the loss is 
originally the loss of the connection to the maternal body, which is demanded by the 
paternalistic law.  In response, Kristeva calls for a “subversion” of that law by tapping 
into the maternal, “semiotic” dimension of language, connected to sound, feeling, and 
poetic creativity.  Butler rejects Kristeva’s solution, in part, on the grounds that 
Kristeva’s “semiotic” dimension of language is merely another legal fiction, posited 
by the law as preceding the law, while in actuality being the law’s own original 
artefact.  In the place of Kristeva’s solution, Butler suggests that, if “subversion is 
possible, it will be a subversion from within the terms of the law, through the 
possibilities that emerge when the law turns against itself and spawns unexpected 
permutations of itself” (119).  Put differently, rather than trying to fight the law from 
outside (which cannot be accessed in language), we should reshape it from within.   
From this I infer that the Butlerian cure for smartphone zombiehood would be a 
modification of smartphones’ use (rather than discarding them from the outset), in 
sympathy with Haraway’s affirmation of cyborgs.  In support of my cyborg-friendly 
interpretation, Butler later in Gender Trouble affirms Mary Douglas’ claim that “what 
constitutes the limit of the body is never merely material,” and that “the surface, the 
skin, is systematically signified by taboos and anticipated transgressions” (167).  As 
a result, Butler concludes that “the boundaries of the body become, within [Douglas’] 
analysis, the limits of the social per se” (167).  Or, in Butler’s own modification of 
this view, “the boundaries of the body” become “the limits of the socially hegemonic” 
(167).  The difference between these two conceptions is that, while Douglas views 
the boundary as fixed universally by society as a whole, Butler sees the boundary as, 
instead, resistible by those who challenge oppressive norms and institutions.  That is, 
bodies according to Butler extend as far as dominant social forces allow, from which 
she infers that “the naturalized notion of ‘the’ body is itself a consequence of taboos 
that render that body discrete by virtue of its stable boundaries” (169).   
Applying this point to smartphone cyborgs, dominant social forces have allowed 
the body to extend into smartphones, and neither this new extension, nor the pre-
smartphone bodily limits, were natural or organic.  In other words, whenever the 
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taboos change (as they have repeatedly in human history), what is conceived as “the 
body itself” changes along with them.  Taking advantage of this reality, finally, allows 
one to change the conception of the limits of the body intentionally, which is what I 
will propose in my next section.  Put briefly, we need to establish and fortify new 
taboos that make explicit the importance of the non-smartphone parts of bodies, both 
the cyborg’s own body, and the bodies of others.  In other words, and to conclude this 
third section, I suggest that compulsive smartphone cyborgs should choose to dance 
differently, so as to achieve better new identities, by extending their sense of 
embodiment beyond their smartphones, through others’ smartphones, and into the 
non-smartphone bodies of other users.  Before getting into the details of this proposal, 
however, I will first give an overview of my figuration of philosophy of dance, with 
which I will then offer a dancing analysis of the dancing performance of smartphone 
cyborg identity. 
 
Zombie-Cyborg Dance Analysis, Utilizing Figuration 
 
To introduce my figuration philosophy of dance, I begin by returning briefly to 
Butler, whose work is the basis for one of the three components of one of its four 
central aspects of dance, or “Moves.”  More specifically, Butler contributes, to the 
Move called “resilience,” the component of “flourishing recirculation.”  In essence, 
flourishing recirculation signifies that the way to flourish is to keep moving, which 
in turn necessitates starting with well-worn circuits and doing whatever possible to 
make those pathways better suited to one’s body and its ways of moving through the 
world.  Butler’s insight here, which draws on Nietzsche by way of Foucault, is that 
compulsion, repetition, and circularity need not be entirely negative or vicious.  
Instead, Butler advocates for improvising each variation on one’s compulsory theme, 
which enables one to bend the compulsive circle into a spiral with an escape 
trajectory, wherein one finds at least a degree of agency.   
Butler’s most famous example of this liberating riffing on compulsion is the 
phenomenon of drag, which she introduces in the context of a “walking” performance 
at a drag ball.  In her words, drag “fully subverts the distinction between inner and 
outer psychic space and effectively mocks both the expressive model of gender and 
the notion of a true gender identity” (174).  The role of mockery and laughter here are 
crucial, but must be carefully deployed, in order to resist a pathological, oppressive 
repetition.  Despite Butler’s concession on this point, some critics have objected to 
Butler’s conception, claiming that it offers too little for political action.  For my part, 
however, I hold with those who see greater potential in her later work, including its 
productive engagements with other thinkers of liberation and social justice.  On this 
note of social justice, I now turn to my overview of figuration, which is based thereon. 
To repeat, figuration is structured around four central constructs dance Moves, 
namely “positure,” “gesture,” “grace” and “resilience.”  As for what counts as 
“dance,” I follow the school of natural language philosophy in an attempt to include 
all the divergent phenomena that we tend to describe as dances today.  Put simply, I 
intend figuration and its Moves to apply, not only to literal dances, such as ballet and 
the waltz, but also to borderline dances, such as the mating dance of many bird 
species, and even to figurative dances such as the “dance” of the celestial bodies 
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through the cosmos and the textual “dance” of a sophisticated writer.  With this 
background in place, I will now elaborate on these four Moves, with an emphasis on 
the final, substantive phrase for each, as this is the most important component. 
First, by “positure,” I mean “the dynamic imitation of stasis.”  The point here is 
that any living animal, even when not obviously moving, is always covertly moving, 
at least internally, in the process of maintaining the appearance of rest.  Second, by 
“gesture,” I mean “the carrying-across funding language.”  With this strange phrasing 
I am attempting to suggest the etymological meaning of gesture (which is “to carry 
across”), in the context of the fact that all gesture (including linguistic gesture) is both 
“funded” (or invested by) and “founded” (or created on the basis of) the movements 
of bodies.  Third, by “grace” I mean “a pleasing figure/ground reversal.”  The figure 
and ground here are the organism and its environment, because in consummately 
graceful movement, the environment seems to move seamlessly through the 
organism.  And fourth, by “resilience” I mean the aforementioned, Butlerian 
“flourishing recirculation.”  My attempt here is to suggest resilience’s etymological 
meaning of “leaping back” or “jumping again,” in part because that foregrounds its 
definition as always springing back into shape, always ready for more, persisting 
through time’s deformations. 
Having offered a brief overview of figuration, I now turn to an analysis of the 
smartphone zombie cyborg dance.  I begin with figuration’s account of the positure 
of animal dance in general.  Animal positure, for figuration, is “spatially minimal 
performances with spatially maximal results, which grow out of a necessarily social 
setting, and which mask animals’ intellectual adaptation through what has historically 
appeared to humans as instincts.”  In the case of the smartphone cyborg-zombie 
identity dance, the spatial “minimal” is the restriction of motion to the surface of the 
phone.  The “maximal results” are the severe physical and psychological effects of 
this fixity, including injuries and accidental death, along with exacerbated isolation 
and social anxiety.  The “necessarily social setting” is the virtual social setting 
represented by social media.  And the adaptation masked as instinct is the effortful 
pursuit of social networking and success, which nevertheless gives the external 
appearance of an instinctive addiction response. 
Animal gesture, figuration defines as “the commandeering of body parts and 
environments into communicative functions which can be performed by various 
members of the same society, and which require the engagement of entire bodies for 
any meaningfully linguistic phenomenon to arise.”  The “commandeering” in 
smartphone cyborg-zombies is the repurposing of body parts toward smartphone 
activities, especially the fingertips and eyes.  The “same member” referent would be 
the interchangeability or substitutability of smartphone users, due to smartphones’ 
status as (among other things) capitalist fetishes.  And “entire bodies” applies insofar 
it is not just the eyes and fingertips which must be engaged, but also the rest of the 
cyborg’s body.  For example, the trunk and limbs are usually rigidly fixed, lest they 
divert energy and focus away from the device, even though doing so may jeopardize 
the cyborg’s physical and psychological wellbeing in the long term. 
Animal grace, figuration defines as “hyper-dramatization of practical activities, 
which highlights the species-importance of activities which far surpass the 
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importance of any particular organism performing it, which in turn suggests an 
analogously greater importance of entire non-human species relative to any particular 
human organism.”  The dramatization of the practical by smartphone cyborg-zombies 
consists in the theatrical nature of social media activity, most of which centers on 
everyday minutiae.  The “species activities” here are predominantly communication 
and networking among humans qua social animals.  And the “non-human species” is 
perhaps the cyborg “species” itself, as opposed to the pre-smartphone homo sapiens 
species that preceded it. 
Finally, figuration defines animal resilience as “hyperbolic imitations of actual 
conflict, which appear random and insane beyond those familiar with the species, 
consisting often of physical circular movements enabling temporal cycles of life to 
continue.”  The “conflict imitations” in smartphone cyborgs are primarily online 
debates and commentary, which infamously often contain a degree of hostility, 
profanity and prejudice unthinkable in most face-to-face interactions.  The apparent 
“randomness” and “insanity” seem to be perceived most vividly by non-cyborg 
humans (especially Baby Boomers).  And the “circular motions” are those of the 
fingertips extending to the screen and retracting, while the “cycles of life” are the life 
cycles of late capitalism, as the U.S. economy becomes increasingly centered on 
smartphones, thereby dragging the world economy in its wake. 
Bringing these analyses of the four Moves on animal grace together, one gets a 
clearer understanding of why compulsive usage causes smartphone cyborgs to 
become zombies.  To wit, they devote most of their mindfulness to a very small 
percentage of their total material being.  And most of whatever consciousness does 
occur in the cyborgs is not directed toward any other body in shared physical space 
(whether the cyborg’s own, or that of another cyborg, or that of a nonhuman animal).  
Instead, a kind of collective herd instinct for abstract affirmation, validation and 
connection supervenes on, and transcends, the individual cyborg organism.  Or, more 
charitably, their limited consciousness could be compared to the awareness of 
individual ants, bees, and other organisms belonging to “hive mind” species.  
Although one could of course affirm or critique this zombie behavior from 
various perspectives and values systems external to smartphone cyborgs, I will not 
do so here.  Instead, I offer an internal, pragmatic critique, the gist of which is that 
this zombie dance is ultimately self-defeating and self-destructive, even by the 
smartphone cyborgs’ own explicit standards.  More specifically, no species, including 
those at least partially artificial species such as the smartphone cyborg, can afford to 
focus such a large percentage of their individual energies on such a small percentage 
of individual bodies and their powers.  Evidence for this conclusion includes the fact 
that organisms’ neglecting most of their bodies is directly correlated with higher rates 
of injury and sickness.   
In the case of the smartphone cyborg-zombies in particular, the most pervasive 
of these neglect-based self-destructive problems are those which are caused by poor 
diets and lack of exercise, including diabetes, cancer, and heart disease.  Thus, for 
smartphone cyborgs’ own sake, they desperately need a dance critique of their current 
identity performances, along with some alternate choreographic strategies to facilitate 
less (unnecessarily) disempowering identities.  To the latter, therefore, I now turn, 
after a brief recap of the foregoing analyses. 
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Figuration toward a Less-Disempowering Smartphone Cyborg Identity 
 
In this article, I first attempted to show that, according to Andy Clark and David 
Chalmers’ “The Extended Mind,” minds can extend beyond the skin and into 
smartphones.  Second, I explored how, following Donna Haraway, the result of this 
mental extension into smartphones amounts to the creation of a new entity, the 
smartphone cyborg.  Third, I traced the implication, from Judith Butler’s account of 
gender identity as dance performance, that smartphone cyborg identity is also the 
near-invisible result of repeated performances.   And fourth, on the basis of these 
three points, I offered a figuration dancing analysis of smartphone cyborg identity 
performance, which revealed why this performance makes smartphone cyborgs into 
zombies.  Now, in this ultimate section, I will sketch four choreographic imperatives, 
intended to help smartphone cyborgs by altering the dance of their identity into 
something less unnecessarily self-disempowering than that of a zombie. 
First, following the Move of positure, a smartphone cyborg should act to preserve 
its entire body, to allow a maximal amount of itself to dance.  This would require 
diverting some time, energy, and attention away from its metal and plastic, and 
toward its flesh.  To facilitate this, I offer the following choreographic imperative: 
cease or minimize smartphone activity in the presence of significant perceivable 
ambient motion, whether in the rest of one’s own body, the bodies of others, or moving 
parts of the environment (such as branches in the wind, and speeding automobiles).  
In other words, only engage in smartphone activity when oneself, other organisms, 
and the environment are predominantly still.  The self-destructiveness of rejecting 
this imperative is that the cyborg would likely fail to notice those physical and 
psychological threats to its continued existence which primarily affect its fleshly 
component. 
Second, following the Move of gesture, a cyborg should try to engage a maximal 
amount of its body in a maximally active way.  This would require channeling social 
media’s powers into the facilitation of more real-life events, including literal dances.  
The corresponding choreographic imperative is as follows: before engaging in a 
smartphone activity (or at least before engaging in a new type of smartphone 
activity), ask yourself, “In what full-bodied activity will this smartphone activity 
terminate?”  In other words, given that one has become a smartphone cyborg, it 
makes sense to integrate and weave together one’s fleshly and non-fleshly parts as 
much as possible.  Or, more simply, each part of the cyborg should act to benefit the 
whole cyborg.  And while the self-destructiveness of rejecting the first choreographic 
imperative exposes oneself to external threats, rejecting this second imperative risks 
exposure to internal threats. 
Third, following the Move of grace, a smartphone cyborg should direct more of 
its smartphone time, energy, and cognition to practical results for a maximal number 
of species.  This would require modifying activities in line with what cyborgs have in 
common with other species (including humans, nonhuman animals, and plants).  
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Central among these commonalities is embodiment, as opposed to the information 
processing of virtual content.  The choreographic imperative here is as follows: 
whenever engaging in smartphone activities that involve interacting with non-
cyborgs, favor those which enable more active roles (than is currently typical) for 
non-cyborg species and for the environment.  In other words, smartphone cyborgs 
should do more things that can be co-done with other, non-cyborg agents, allowing 
others their fair share of the spotlight.  Rejecting this third choreographic imperative 
threatens the existence of the entire cyborg species, which (like all others) depends in 
many complex and largely-invisible ways on other species and the environment. 
And finally, following the Move of resilience, smartphone cyborgs should 
enlarge and augment what one might call the “physical circularity” of their actions.  
This would require engaging in more actions that are capable of being completed as 
a loop in four-dimensional embodied space, as opposed to actions like posting 
comments on social media (which tend to be more standalone and isolated, and less 
mindfully engaged with responses and holistic conclusions).  As for the 
choreographic imperative: favor smartphone activities that constitute the clear 
beginnings of more complex activities, whose beginnings, middles, and ends are 
firmly anchored in four-dimensional spacetime.  In other words, smartphone cyborgs 
should do things that can be sustained, both by their own bodies and by the bodies of 
other smartphone cyborgs, rather than falling into increasing bodily isolation.  To 
reject this final choreographic imperative is to risk undermining intra-species 
cooperation, without which any species as such (as contrasted with the individual 
organisms of that species) eventually ceases to exist.  This is not to say that individual 
entities might not continue to exist, but they would do so as non-cyborgs (by ceasing 
to use smartphones), which would thus destroy the smartphone cyborg species 
without destroying its (former) organisms. 
To summarize these four choreographic imperatives, a less unnecessarily 
disempowering, non-zombie dancing performance of smartphone cyborg identity 
would involve the following four characteristics: (1a) self-care for the cyborg’s entire 
body, (2a) mindfulness toward the surrounding physical world, (3a) stewardship of 
the environment and non-cyborg species, and (4a) a narrative/historical comportment 
toward future-directed sustainability.  By contrast, zombie performance (in general) 
displays the following four opposed characteristics: zombies (1b) frequently neglect 
almost the entirety of their bodies in deference to their hunger to consume, (2b) are 
not discouraged by even the deterioration or loss of large portions of their bodies, 
(3b) do not react differentially based on their environments (beyond the latter’s 
facilitation of their consumption), and (4b) have no memories of the past, hopes for 
the future, nor even the capacity to engage in historically-minded activities in the 
present.  The way these latter four characteristics manifest in smartphone cyborg-
zombies is that they frequently (1b1) neglect sleep, proper diet and exercise; (2b1) 
are indifferent to things like massive weight gain and the risk of death from texting 
while driving; (3b1) behave the same way whether indoors or outdoors, alone or with 
humans, etc.; and (4b1) focus predominantly on current stimulation and trends, with 
little regard for history or the distant future.   
Altogether, these points recall Nietzsche’s observation that in evolutionary 
history, consciousness originally “constitutes a danger for the organism.”  From one 
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perspective, smartphone cyborgs represent a regression or withdrawal from human 
consciousness.  But from another perspective, they represent a new kind of 
consciousness, or at least a new simulacrum thereof.  Thus, smartphone cyborgs can 
be interpreted as either protecting individual homo sapiens from the danger that 
evolved for our species, or as protecting the new individual “homo cyborgs” from the 
smartphone consciousness that has not yet been fully and healthfully integrated into 
a new smartphone cyborg species.   
Given the current popularity of smartphones and the pervasively compulsive use 
thereof, especially by Millennials and Generation Z, the latter interpretation seems 
more pragmatically effective at this point, and so I have allowed it to guide my 
analyses here.  From that strategic vantage point, I am suggesting that smartphone 
cyborgs can evolve themselves, using strategies such as these figuration 
choreographic imperatives, to self-overcome what will have been a merely temporary 
zombie phase—and embrace a more enabling and flourishing cyborg way of being. 
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